The impact of the 2010 Winter Olympics on Aboriginal aspirations and grievances

Conflict reconciliation or economic exploitation?

Olympic banners at B.C. Place Stadium, February 19, 2010

By AlexAranda. Source: Shutterstock.com

The XXI Winter Olympic Games (the Games) were held in Vancouver and Whistler from February through March of 2010. Obscured behind the sports spectacle, the displays of national patriotism, and the corporate logos was the continuing narrative of racialization and failed relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.

Significance of Mega-Events

The Olympic Games, as mega events, have the ability to alter a host region and country economically, physically, socially, and politically (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 1; Reese, n. d., p. 2). The Games provided opportunities for remediating the divide between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canadian society (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 1). In examining the inclusion, participation, and empowerment of the Aboriginal Nations involved in the production of the Games, some analyses conclude that this relationship improved (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 2). Looking at limited aspects of the Games may produce misleading conclusions. Kidd points out that examining the Games outcomes “has to be a multi-factor calculation”(2011, p. 2). Relevant factors include the complexities of the Aboriginal populations, their grievances and aspirations, the belief systems and circumstances present, the approaches taken and the nature of interactions, and what was and was not achieved. The goal of this paper is to explore these areas to better determine whether the Games indeed provided some measure of reconciliation.

Aboriginal Demographics and Circumstances

Aboriginal people self-identify as the descendants of Indigenous peoples belonging to the treaty or nontreaty groups in Canada, as well as Métis and Inuit peoples (Schatz, 2010, p. 3). First Nations refers to the Aboriginal groups that had self-governance and excludes Métis and Inuit peoples (Canada’s First People, 2007). Over several thousand years the west coast Aboriginal peoples had developed a sophisticated culture and social order (Borrows, 2008, p. 1). European contact occurred in 1778 and a trading relationship began. Contact also brought about disease epidemics, in particular smallpox, which depopulated Aboriginal populations up to 90% (First Nations, n. d.). From about 1850 on European settlements began, as did an ethnopolitical conflict in which Aboriginal peoples were overwhelmed and marginalized. In 1871 British Columbia joined Canada. Racialization and social injustice towards First Nations escalated when they were forced on to reserves under the federal Indian Act of 1876 and its assimilationist policies designed to end First Nations sovereignty (Ladner, 2006, p. 7; Edelson, 2011, p. 805).

The Vancouver region where the Games were held in 2010 held a population of approximately 2.3 million people (Statistics Canada, 2012), of which under 2% were Aboriginal (GVDR Policy & Planning Department, 2003, p. 1). The Aboriginal population was divided unequally between those living on-reserve and those living off-reserve. Of the ten First Nations in the Vancouver region, the Games locales fell on the traditional territories of four nations, the Lil’wat, Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh. Their population data closest to 2010 are on the following table.

These four Coast Salish nations possessed continuity of territory, history, culture, language, community, and relationship. None had a comprehensive treaty agreement (Silver, Meletis, & Vadi, 2012, p. 295).

The Games also potentially would impact Vancouver’s larger Aboriginal population of approximately 12,000 people (Statistics Canada, 2013), which was centered in the marginalized Downtown Eastside (DES) and where they composed 10% of the residents (City of Vancouver, 2012, p. 9). In contrast to the local nations, this was a large heterogeneous population mostly from other areas of British Columbia and Canada (Wells, 2008, p. 21; Schatz, 2010, p. 10). This urban population had considerable diversity of culture, language, and heritage, along with a lack of integrated political, social, or community structures (Graham & Peters, 2002, p. 11). The migration of Aboriginal peoples from rural reserves into the depressed core of Vancouver was a move from one impoverishment to another (Boykoff, 2011, p. 52; Chrismas, 2012-13, p. 11).

The urban Aboriginal population endured loss of family, community, and cultural connections; high rates of criminal victimization, criminal involvement, domestic violence, illicit drug addiction, unemployment, suicide, and mental health problems; and lower health, education, employment, and economic outcomes (Wells, 2008, p. I; Schatz, 2010, p. 6; Chrismas, 2012-13, p. 5). Topping these challenges were the number of homeless Aboriginal peoples, who constituted approximately 30% of the DES homeless count (Wells, 2008, p. 6; Vadi, 2010, p. 38). Two-thirds of the Aboriginal homeless were women (Schatz, 2010, p. 10). More dismally, the majority of the fifty plus women missing from the DES at the time were Aboriginal (Schatz, 2010, p. 12). Response to the distressed state of the urban Aboriginal population was delivered by a patchwork of largely government funded community organizations (Wells, 2008, p. 9; Graham & Peters, 2002, p. 11).

Olympic Interest

Reflecting on the success of Expo 86 in Vancouver, several business people envisioned another world event in the region to enhance tourism, investment, and growth (Edelson, 2011, p. 810; Vanwynsberghe, Surborg, & Wyly, 2013, p. 2074). With city and provincial governments support these individuals formed the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Winter Games. The committee was chosen by the Canadian Olympic Committee to develop Canada’s presentation to the International Olympic Committee (IOC). In June 1999 an expanded Olympic Games Bid Committee was formed containing business and government representatives.

As the modern Olympics have grown ever larger, international pressures have increased to address the event’s impacts on a host’s finances, environment, and population. In response, the IOC established sustainability requirements. Just as the Bid Committee was forming in 1999, the IOC added ‘social sustainability’ to its host selection criteria. In regards to Indigenous peoples, the IOC acknowledged their marginalization and now required substantive roles for them with the Olympics (Sidsworth, 2010, pp. 126-127; Silver et al., 2012, p. 294; Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013, pp. 2078-2079).

Framing a Reputable Bid

Intent on securing the wealth opportunities presented by the Games, the Bid Committee publicly espoused promises in a multitude of areas, including, economic, social, environmental, communications, inclusivity, and civil liberties (Kidd, 2011, p. 10). To underscore these commitments, the group urged transparency in decision-making and that an independent watchdog be funded (Edelson, 2011, p. 811-812). Consequently, the ‘Impacts of the Olympics on Community Coalition’ (IOCC) was created in 2002 to scrutinize Games undertakings. IOCC representatives, community members, and the City developed more specific social commitments in an ‘Inner City Inclusivity Commitment Statement’ (ICICS) which then formed part of the bid (Edelson, 2011, p. 811). The ICICS was an unprecedented bid-level pledge to include community concerns in Games planning (Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013, p. 2076).

Recognizing that the Games could take place on their unceded traditional territories, the Chiefs of the Squamish and Lil’wat Nations approached the Bid Committee and expressed their interest in joining the bid process (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 124). With Aboriginal support and involvement critical to the bid, a Shared Legacies agreement was negotiated and signed in November 2002 between the two Nations and government stakeholders. This agreement assured support for a new cultural centre, development funds, and 300 acres of Crown Land in Whistler worth an estimated 13.5 million dollars (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 162; Vadi, 2010, p. 99). In due course it became apparent that the Musqueam and Tsleil-Watuth Nations needed to be engaged as their unceded territories were also involved. For their Games support a Memorandum of Understanding was agreed to in July 2003, providing assurances of economic and other benefits.

The Games Come to Vancouver

In July 2003 the IOC selected Vancouver and Whistler to host the Games. In September 2003 the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) was established as a federally incorporated company, with no obligation to the public (Vadi, 2010, p. 48). Still needing public and international support for the Games financial success, VANOC “committed to extend Aboriginal involvement” (Vadi, 2010, p. iv). Bourgeois, a year before the Games, made the observation that “In constructing its international identity, VANOC has emphasized its benevolent and respectful relationship with First Nations peoples, advancing the perception that Native peoples are, indeed, valued and included in these Games (and, by extension, in Canadian society)” (2009, p. 39).

Bargaining with the Nations

Four Host First Nations Logo. Designer: Jody Broomfield / Squamish Nation

Source: http://canadiandesignresource.ca/graphics/logo/four-host-first-nations-logo/

To better represent their interests, in November 2004 the four nations involved formed the Four Host First Nations (FHFN) society. The creation of the FHFN was funded by an $800,000 grant to them by the federal Department of Canadian Heritage (Vadi, 2010, p. 108). A VANOC-FHFN Protocol Agreement was signed in November 2005, creating a formal partnership (Vadi, 2010, p. 46) in which the FHFN became co-hosts of the Games and with significant control over all Aboriginal business involvement. VANOC viewed the partnership with the FHFN as critical to manage Aboriginal legal rights and title and to avoid any form of resistance (Vadi, 2010, pp. 134-135). Working with the FHFN side-stepped land claims issues, diminished political unrest, provided greater investment certainty, and promoted the Vancouver Games as unique (Vadi, 2010, p. 70). VANOC quickly solidified the FHFN partnership, encouraging the Ministry of Transport to grant contracts valued at $470,000 to FHFN member companies for start-up road work and in creating a FHFN Games employment strategy (Sidsworth, 2010, pp. 201-202). The four nations each also received 17.5 million dollars for supporting the Games (Vadi, 2010, p. 99; Kidd, 2011, p. 7). FHFN thereafter appears to have engaged VANOC in continuous interest-based negotiations, leveraging their power to maximize their socio-economic interests (Silver et al., 2012, p. 292). The Squamish band subsequently received a new community centre in Whistler, and the Aboriginal Pavilion after the Games was re-assembled on Musqueam territory (Kidd, 2011, p. 4). When VANOC did not need to build promised temporary housing at Whistler for Squamish and Lil’Wat staff they paid out 3 million dollars in lieu to each Nation. Musqueam and Tsleil-Waututh nations also received 18 million dollars for the purchase of lands to address issues in reserve size (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 12). The cash benefits, education and training, thousands of employment opportunities, numerous contracts, facilities, performance fees, and merchandise sales received by Aboriginal peoples totalled an estimated 200 million dollars, with the largest share going to the FHFN (Vadi, 2010, pp. 99-100). The FHFN partnership also provided the Games unequivocal evidence of ‘Aboriginal participation’.

Dealing with the Urban Population

Vancouver Aboriginal Friendship Centre, East Hastings Street, Vancouver

VANOC had still inherited the Bid Committee’s ICICS social sustainability commitments. These promises were supported by the city and public, but were immaterial to the profit goals of the multinational corporate sponsors (Vadi, 2010, p. 29). The unique plight of the urban Aboriginal population was enduring as the city was least equipped to address the issues (Wells, 2008, p. 9) and both the federal and provincial governments were insisting that each other was responsible for those off-reserve (Wells, 2008, p. 12). Without leverage that comes with territory, the urban Aboriginal population was unempowered in addressing their marginalization (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 215). In this gap, driven by a belief system “that participation in the labour force is a panacea for all social ills” (Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013, p. 2081), VANOC then played the role of “neoliberal social trustee” (Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013, p. 2089). Meeting their social sustainability commitments was restricted to offering Vancouver’s inner-city population business opportunities, job training, and employment (Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013, p. 2078). VANOC and several corporate sponsors in 2005 contracted minor work to DES businesses, which would “… turn an unproductive downtown population into a productive one without having to address much larger social issues…” (Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013, p. 2087). The endemic issues of the DES were of course not resolved through VANOC’s approach. (Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013, p. 2089). Indeed, by 2006 VANOC began to retreat from its commitments in the ICICS objectives and to “drop some of them entirely”(Vanwynsberghe et al., 2013, p. 2082).

The Protest Community

Rally at Pigeon Park, Downtown Eastside, Vancouver, Feb. 10, 2010

Source: Flickr via Wikimedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Olympic_Tent_City_- _Day_1_banner.jpg

Just as the corporate world and the local First Nations perceived opportunities, so did local activists. First responses to the Games were ad hoc. Individuals and groups eventually came together under the ‘Olympics Resistance Network’, a coalition which shared anti-capitalist and anti-colonial sentiments (Vadi, 2010, pp. 103-104). Their actions culminated with a 5000-person protest at the opening ceremonies on February 12, 2010 (Silver et al., p. 296; Schatz, 2010, p. 3). As soon as the Games began media and public attention became immersed in the Games and moved away from protesters and their issues.

The main protest theme centered on tax money being lavished on a one-time sports event rather than funding critical social services and infrastructure. The most significant concern was the need for social housing for the homeless, particularly amongst Aboriginal peoples (Vadi, 2010, pp. 119-120). Protested also was that the Olympics were taking place on unceded Coast Salish territory. These protests angered the local Coast Salish First Nations as this was their territory. The Chief Executive Officer of the FHFN publicly stated that the protesters were deeply disrespectful and acting against sacred protocols in claiming to represent the Aboriginal people of the region (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 285). The Chief of the Squamish Nation harshly critiqued the protesters, observing that the Squamish people know their land and its status and they alone will speak to what is created on it (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 14).

Discussion

The Games in Vancouver were motivated by a capitalist pursuit of wealth by economic and political elites holding neoliberal beliefs and a neocolonial worldview. To reap the Games treasure, the elites had to contend with the unreconciled relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples and the unreconciled jurisdiction between the Canadian Nation and local First Nations who occupied the same lands. To press for these reconciliations the local First Nations had the power to disrupt the games through direct action. Evidence suggests direct action creates more willingness by governments to negotiate and give concessions (de Costa & Knight, 2011, p. 224), though, dependant on the circumstances, the opposite may be true where governments become “unwilling to engage confrontational negotiating partners” (Morden, 2013, pp. 507-508). The FHFN put aside leveraging the Games for reconciliation in favour of pursuing a portion of the Games wealth. The local First Nations received tens of millions of dollars of benefit to a combined reserve population of approximately 4,250 people. Many critics of the Games viewed VANOC’s strategy with the FHFN as simply further economic, political, and cultural exploitation (Vadi, 2010, p. 5). The same can be said of the FHFN.

The Games illustrated that neocolonialism can at times be answered by First Nations applying equivalent approaches, including organizing into a collective legal entity, leveraging the power of potential legal or direct actions, utilizing interest-based bargaining, collaborating with a corporation, and managing public perceptions. The irony of course is the assimilationist aspects of doing this. In what was sought by the FHFN and how this was accomplished the Games provide a report on the degree to which the local nations had integrated with “overarching norms and institutions” (Gillian & Ball, 2011, p. 156). However, utilizing dominate society tactics recognizes interdependence and provides the ability to forestall further societal decline (Connolly, 1994, pp. 30-31). Those who work within neocolonial frameworks are often accused of being coopted (Morden, 2015, p. 273). The Games underscored the division amongst Aboriginal peoples, as accusations of betrayal and blindness of other Aboriginal peoples’ situations were cast at the FHFN (Bourgeois, 2009, pp. 43-44) and the FHFN cast back.

While the FHFN sought to obtain affluence, the urban population hoped to be lifted from marginalization. The elites promoting the Games appeared to have no will to deliver on the social responsibility commitments. The urban Aboriginal population had no power, nominal organization, and appealed for justice only through protest. By the start of the Games the promises made to them had evaporated and the public’s attention had moved on to the unfolding spectacle.

Conclusions

There are some who laud the Games as a successful and broadly transferable model of Aboriginal participation and relationship with government and the private sector (Sidsworth, 2010, p. 11). The evidence, however, suggests that this model is applicable only to mega events and provides benefits only to the small number of local Aboriginal people who have leverage. The FHFN-VANOC model was not focused on reconciliation by either party, but on wealth acquisition. It has no apparent value for Canada’s need for recognition of and reconciliation with the approximate 1.4 million Aboriginal peoples.

Closing

The Games were to be a happy event with a positive image of the relationship with and the state of Aboriginal peoples. The sordid narrative of the past and the contemporary injustices that it created were to be left for another day. The historical and national narratives were collectively altered to give marketable images of culture, positive relationships, and an illusion of reconciliation (O’Bonsawin, 2010). The Games did not uplift the marginalized and did not transform the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada. Indeed, the Games can be seen to have reinforced neocolonial nationalism, exalted neoliberal economic exploitation, and glorified a winner-loser mindset.

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